Indigenisation of critical components within the defence sector is not just a policy goal; it’s a strategic imperative for national security.
My lecture during the conclave on Dec 17, 2024, delved into the complexities of this issue, particularly within the rapidly evolving drone ecosystem, drawing on insights from my own experiences in the Indian Air Force and subsequent research during my tenure with the Centre for Air Power Studies.
There is a famous quote attributed to Abe Lincoln:
“Give me six hours to chop down a tree, and I will spend the first four sharpening the axe.”
This principle is equally crucial for a successful indigenisation effort.
Somehow, despite all our efforts, we have not been able to break through the Rubicon of 60% level or thereabouts. seen in most of our efforts, and we are aware that 60% is a key figure in the Defence Procurement Manual that is deciding the preferred procurement bracket.
Therefore, one method of defining a “critical component” can be stated as:-
“All those components that are preventing the indigenisation efforts to reach the 100% levels.”
To understand this aspect and contextualise this discussion, we can closely examine the Ministry of Defence’s annual report for 2023 (Press Release 22 Dec 2023). This report issued as a press release in December 2023 highlights several key achievements under the “Atmanirbharta” (self-reliance) initiatives and includes:
- Release of the fifth Positive Indigenisation List.
- Indigenous Defence production exceeding ₹1 lakh crore.
- Defence exports surpassed the figure of ₹16,000 crore for the first time.
- A Dedicated budget of 75% of the total has been set aside for domestic industry.
- Establishment of a facility to manufacture Light Utility Helicopter.
- Orders have been placed for 83 LCA- Tejas
- Orders have also been placed for 55 C-295 aircraft.
Furthermore, as mentioned in the same press release, the Defence Acquisition Council also approved proposals worth ₹3.50 lakh crore to bolster operational preparedness.
However, there are a few key figures mentioned that are worth a closer look. The best figures for the percentage of indigenisation mentioned for the Indian Navy for the “float” is 90% indigenisation and this reduces to 50% for the “flight” head. So anything that is lighter and compact is “critical”. And hence our efforts in the field of composites as mentioned about the “Flying Wing” experimental flight of the DRDO.
The impact of this shortfall in percentage terms that has existed throughout the past decades extends beyond the obvious and has security and strategic implications, especially for the armed forces.
This is especially true in the context of Unmanned Aerial Systems and Drones.
The domestic ecosystem is rapidly developing to capitalise upon the opportunity accorded by the provisions of Drone Rules 2021.
But is there a method by which we can ensure that in this relatively nascent and growing ecosystem, the government and industry ensure that we reach true 100% indigenisation levels on priority? Especially where the bill for materials is relatively small.
In order to understand the issue at hand further, let us ask ourselves a few more questions:
- Do we know which drone components (software & hardware) are truly “critical”?
- Do we understand the potential security and strategic implications of relying on components for which the technology ownership lies beyond Indian shores?
- Can we say with some certainty that all the equipment inducted is free from vulnerabilities and will perform as expected and stated under all conditions?
- Are we prepared to research and address systemic vulnerabilities?
- Are we satisfied with the current pace and depth of indigenisation efforts?
Drones do present a unique opportunity for strategic indigenisation.
We should also be acutely aware that the threat landscape constantly evolves, shifting from hardware to software-centric vulnerabilities.
Examples include using electronic warfare-based measures in recent conflicts and targeted cyberattacks on private companies. In one case, the planning involved years of painstaking effort that was unknown to the private company. The increasing sophistication of cyberattacks, the targeting of private companies, and the vulnerability of critical systems underscores the need for vigilance.
This also necessitates a proactive approach to risk identification, assessment and mitigation. One way of addressing these issues is to identify the challenges and implement well-thought out solutions.
Some of the key challenges that impede complete indigenisation:
- Procurement complexities are specified in the Defence Procurement Manual.
- A competitive landscape often prioritises ROI over long-term strategic goals.
- There is a need to ensure domestic supply chains and component-level standardisation of drone systems and subsystems.
- Ensuring cost-effectiveness & dependability of supply chains.
A collaborative approach between regulators, industry, and end-users (Defence forces) is essential to overcome these hurdles. Several initiatives have already been undertaken. These include promoting greater interaction among the stakeholders and initiatives such as IdeX, Aditi & TDF.
A few initiatives can easily be implemented by the regulator, industry and Defence Forces.
Regulators can implement robust procedures to verify and certify indigenisation claims for military applications. They need to roll out component-level certification mechanisms as a part of type certification & validation procedures.
The developing industrial ecosystem needs to self-regulate and adopt self-auditing practices to counter cybersecurity threats and ensure the robustness of the systems being offered to the armed forces.
Government entities, including defence forces, must conduct regular and thorough audits of inducted equipment and further democratise the dissemination of requirements to the developing military-academia-industry complex.
Therefore, there is a lot of collective effort we need to put in and must choose wisely between the two choices we face.
We can either continue on the current trajectory, potentially settling for a continuum of a superficial 60% indigenisation rate or explore alternate and innovative approaches to truly realise the promise of self-reliance and indigenisation catering to the evolving geopolitical landscape .
I hope we make wise choices and exhibit true resilience and not stop at the final basecamp just below the summit, as Dr A PJ Abdul Kalam once stated:
