The Zhuhai Airshow 2022
At the Zhuhai Airshow 2022,[1] held in China between 8-13 Nov 2022, the Chinese Military complex showcased an extensive range of uncrewed aerial systems (UAS). These included concepts such as the FH-97A Loyal Wingman and the IED carrying /” Hexacopter”- Loong -4. The display also included the Electronic Warfare “Specialist” WZ-10 and more than 15 variants of the “CH” series drones. In addition, some of the videos appearing in the Chinese media channels also showed the launch of 100s of drones as a part of a drone swarm to achieve a particular task.
In addition to these large and small systems, two Counter Drone systems to deal with the Small UAV threat were also on display. These were the HQ-17AE¾a relatively short-range system with a range of 5 KM¾and the FK3000 with a claimed range of 12KM.
Even the most sceptical of China watchers have acknowledged the progress made by the Chinese in developing their drone manufacturing capabilities in both military and civil domains.
Additional capability development supporting drones in terms of satellite-based command and control systems has also been a focus area. The entire range showcased suggests the emphasis the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) places on using drones as a part of their operational combat plans. Hence, the question that needs to be answered by us in India the question is how we should perceive these developments.
[1] YouTube, Zhuhai Air Show 2022: , https://youtu.be/OD-GNTA_tGc accessed Nov 14, 2022.
The Drone as Weapon of War
The Chinese have been rather unscrupulously supplying these military-grade drones at an attractive price point to many countries. Besides military-grade drones, Chinese companies such as DJI are market leaders in commercial space. Most of the drone industry of the World, including that of India, is being sustained by key components being sourced from Chinese manufacturers at a virtually unbeatable price point.
The commercial grade drones are being extensively used to support military operations in the ongoing Ukrainian-Russian conflict as weapons of war. The important point to note is that these commercial offerings are side-agnostic, and both sides have been able to modify these to use for combat and combat support operations. Therefore, the two sides can only be differentiated in terms of the communication systems and the type of ordnance being used.
Commercial Drones thus have enabled participation by unlikely “combatants” too. For example, a young boy has been credited with the discovery and the subsequent destruction of an enemy tank column. He used a commercial-grade drone to trace, locate and report the exact target coordinates. These developments are worrisome from a security point of view, with several implications.
Therefore, security agencies across the World, as well as major counter-drone manufacturing companies of the World, are keenly observing the ongoing Ukrainian-Russian conflict. They are treating the conflict as a case study and an opportunity to test their systems in actual combat operations. A few years ago, the use of drones had decisively impacted the outcome of the Armenian- Azerbaijani conflict in Azerbaijan’s favour.
Over the years, using drones as a tool of trade by terrorists and criminals has also gained traction. One of the key reasons for this is the easy availability of the spares, the necessary know-how to construct a drone and the cloak it offers against fixing attributability and responsibility.
The opportunistic Chinese are also watching closely and have already moved to exploit the commercial opportunity by marketing the Loong-5 IED-carrying Hexacopter. And this unbridled availability adds another dimension to the Chinese military threat involving Drones.
The Capability
Over the years, the Chinese have built up an enviable expertise in unmanned systems, including the concept of swarms. Despite carrying an adverse reputation of “quality and reliability,” Chinese drones are finding increased acceptance among many overseas customers. In past conflicts, the Chinese have overcome unfavourable technological asymmetry with a superior number of “low-tech” systems.
So, these systems pose obvious threats for their targets in their conventional deployment of reconnaissance, surveillance identification and suppression of key assets, including the force multipliers. While using multiple systems as a part of saturation strike is a known strategy, the evolving use of drone swarms and the concept of Loyal Wingman are increasingly looking as a futuristic option to gain superiority over the enemy.
Meanwhile, the Chinese President has also consolidated his power and hold and has allowed himself to be photographed in military fatigues. President Xi Jinping has told the People’s Liberation Army to “focus all its energy on fighting” in preparation for war.
We also understand that the Chinese are quite adept at hiding their intentions and biding their time. They are likely to complement the strategy of military coercion through a well-thought-out policy of economic coercion too. The dependencies of the World and the Indian Drone Manufacturing ecosystem on Chinese manufacturers are well known.
The Chinese are also quite adept at using all such dependencies as a part of their military, economic and political coercion strategy. They also want to create new ones as a part of their statecraft.
Therefore, we need to be aware of such efforts and have a plan to keep the trade imbalances in check while promoting our local indigenisation efforts. We also must be wary of the backdoors being built into the software and hardware components being imported to help manufacture equipment for use by our armed forces.
More importantly, we must continue our indigenisation efforts and chart out a response plan that tackles the expected coercion strategy and denies the efforts to exploit the existing fault lines in various parts of the country that impact national security and develops force resilience in a cost-effective manner.
