The Great C-UAS Debate: Beyond the Hype & Machines

Bhupinder S. Nijjar

The Mercer Street Attack

On Aug 01, 2021 the press statement issued by the US Secretary of State Anthony J. Blinken condemned the attack on a Liberian registered vessel sailing in international waters. The attack was carried out using “one-way explosive UAVs”. The statement indicates that more than one “explosive-UAV” was  involved in the attack. The statement while blaming Iran for the attack that killed two aboard the ship, promised an appropriate response. This attack is clearly a part of the escalation of the conflict taking place in the “grey zones”, where the Drones or the UAVs being used, introduce an element of deniability. In this particular case the importance of target selection has been evident from the reaction from the countries affected. The USA, Israel, UK and Romania are the countries that have reacted to the attack. The lack of clear attributability makes the UAVs as the  “bad guy” and rolling out of appropriate countermeasures a priority.    

The Drone "Proliferation"

 The Drone or the  Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) along with its associated ground based control system is called as the Uncrewed Aerial System (UAS). The term “Uncrewed” is a bit of a misnomer as there is always a human in the loop in the existing systems. It is just that the aerial element doesn’t have a person on board. 
     The advancements in composites, 3D-Printing methods, miniaturisation, IoT (Internet of Things), automation and associated disruptive technologies such as AI (Artificial Intelligence) are enabling a global “Drone Revolution”, as these Drones are deployed in ever-increasing numbers for commercial and military applications. It is also a fact that perhaps for the first time, the commercially available technological innovations are driving military applications.  There is also a significant increase in automated processes resulting in a reduction in process times and a faster decision cycle, thus enabling efficient completion of complex tasks. One such example is that of enabling an individual to operate multiple airborne UAS elements at geographically dispersed locations. There is also rapid progress towards the ability of operating various airborne, surface and sub-surface drones in a networked manner to achieve a particular task.
     Hitherto, the military applications of the drone fast-outpaced the civilian ones. The military terms that are dominating the current narrative are the use of “Swarms” and the concept of a “Loyal Wingman” beside their use as a potent surveillance platform with a “long” endurance capability. 
     As the disruptive nature of the platform was realised, the potential battlefield advantage of the UAS system was thereafter sought to be neutralised by developing counter-UAS systems (C-UAS). In the past few years, the rather “lazy” pace of development of C-UAS systems can be seen through the prism of certain data points. There is also a clear  shift towards the UAS being used increasingly by non-state actors too. A few of these broad examples are: 
              Use of Drones as a part of “US War on Terror”, with a global footprint. 
              Use of Drones by Turkey along its Syrian border. 
             Use of UAS sourced from Turkey and Israel by Azeri forces to win the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
             Use of Drone Swarms during the recent Israeli- Hamas/Hezbollah confrontation in the West-Bank region. 
             Use of the Turkish “Kargu” AI-enabled drone in Libya. 
             Use of crude Drone swarms against Russian and American assets in Syria & Iraq, respectively. 
            Use of Drones by suspected Houthi militia to attack various targets in Saudi Arabia.
            Use of Drone to attack Jammu airfield (India). 
     Each of these uses have been justified by the aggressor as per his convenience. In many cases, it has enhanced the business value of the company manufacturing the drones having “proved” their capability. Each of these uses also  focuses upon the “drone” as the “villain” and a useful machine used as a weapon aiming to derive benefits of minimising risk and maximising deniability. The examples quoted above have also generated millions of dollars of revenue for the “battle-proven” technologies. 
        However, the clear sign of its increased use by state/non-state players using the cloak of deniability has resulted in the urgent requirement of C-UASs.   

The C-UAS Dilemma

The countermeasures that were being deployed were quite visible during the visit of President Biden to Belgium on June 14, 2021. The Belgian police were seen to deploy two handheld C-UAS systems. While one was a Radio Frequency Jamming System and the other was capable of firing a net -projectile. The multi-band RF jammer can disrupt the command and control links with which the drone is being directed onto its target. The autonomous system, however, could still be able to get through due to the pre-programmed navigational capability. Advancements in microprocessors (GPS enabled autopilots) and other enabling technologies such as AI have complimented the use of GPS for navigation. It is possible for a UAV to now navigate using photographs. This was on display during the flights undertaken by the Ingenuity Rotary(wing)-UAV (RUAV) on Mars. What was not visible was the non-equipment based effort that is required to be undertaken for UAV threat mitigation. This effort is seen to be along two specific axes. 
       While one involves the development of a robust intelligence-based threat detection and response system, the other is through the regulatory route. The regulations governing the commercial exploitation of the UAS are likely to have an extensive economic implication on the local economies. Hence, there are pressure groups in every country wanting deregulation of some of the security architecture in place for the rollout of professional Drone services, especially in the Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) domain. The dilemma for the authorities is to find the right balance between the various approaches and processes adopted. However, the need to view the UAV threat with a perspective focussed upon the operator rather than the machine is of prime importance in evolving the desired C-UAS countermeasure architecture. 

Beyond the Hype

A great deal of debate was generated in the Indian news space after the IED attacks at Jammu airbase on June 27, 2021. All possible C-UAS measures have been debated by the various UAV “experts” threadbare. The hype has also resulted in the induction of new C-UAS systems too while rekindling the debate on the need for robust Air Defence measures.  
     However, as the dust has settled, it is evident that the threat is real, and the overarching question of the desired end state of a C-UAS response mechanism needs a careful formulation. 
     Such a response would invariably involve seamless integration of threat prevention, detection, identification and mitigation (tracking & neutralisation) measures.  While the revised version of the UAS 2021 rules for commercial exploitation of the UAVs are awaited, which facilitate the roll-out of commercial services, the security agencies are well aware of the ease with which rogue elements can access the Drone sub-assemblies and components before using them to by-pass traditional defence systems.  This has been the subject of many a debate all over the world, including International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), DGCA (India), FAA (US) and EASA (EASA). While all the regulators are busy working out the modalities, there is a visible movement towards actively deploying C-UAS solutions involving Radar systems as well as active and passive countermeasures. However, the key focus area has to be the intelligence-based approach targeting the operator and one which moves beyond the machine. The intelligence-based approach needs to have a robust integration (possibly automated) with the Air Defence system and processes and a C-UAS  system which would enable a faster response time and a reduced decision cycle. All this is possible while we eagerly await the revised UAS 2021 rules which factor in the preliminary results of the BVLOS trials.