A great deal of debate was generated in the Indian news space after the IED attacks at Jammu airbase on June 27, 2021. All possible C-UAS measures have been debated by the various UAV “experts” threadbare. The hype has also resulted in the induction of new C-UAS systems too while rekindling the debate on the need for robust Air Defence measures.
However, as the dust has settled, it is evident that the threat is real, and the overarching question of the desired end state of a C-UAS response mechanism needs a careful formulation.
Such a response would invariably involve seamless integration of threat prevention, detection, identification and mitigation (tracking & neutralisation) measures. While the revised version of the UAS 2021 rules for commercial exploitation of the UAVs are awaited, which facilitate the roll-out of commercial services, the security agencies are well aware of the ease with which rogue elements can access the Drone sub-assemblies and components before using them to by-pass traditional defence systems. This has been the subject of many a debate all over the world, including International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), DGCA (India), FAA (US) and EASA (EASA). While all the regulators are busy working out the modalities, there is a visible movement towards actively deploying C-UAS solutions involving Radar systems as well as active and passive countermeasures. However, the key focus area has to be the intelligence-based approach targeting the operator and one which moves beyond the machine. The intelligence-based approach needs to have a robust integration (possibly automated) with the Air Defence system and processes and a C-UAS system which would enable a faster response time and a reduced decision cycle. All this is possible while we eagerly await the revised UAS 2021 rules which factor in the preliminary results of the BVLOS trials.